Unbeatable imitation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.05.002zbMath1274.91009arXiv1003.4274OpenAlexW3037281587MaRDI QIDQ380852

Jörg Oechssler, Peter Duersch, Burkhard C. Schipper

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1003.4274

zbMATH Keywords

learningzero-sum gamesrock-paper-scissorssymmetric gamesfinite population ESSgeneralized ordinal potential gamesimitate-the-bestquasiconcave gamesrelative payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (16)

The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance ⋮ Pure strategy equilibrium in finite weakly unilaterally competitive games ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Evolutionary stability is sensitive on the conflict between reproduction and survival: proofs ⋮ General non-linear imitation leads to limit cycles in eco-evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks ⋮ Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games ⋮ Ordinal potentials in smooth games ⋮ Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures ⋮ When is tit-for-tat unbeatable? ⋮ Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism ⋮ Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response ⋮ Two-person pairwise solvable games ⋮ Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies ⋮ Beatable imitation in symmetric games with perturbed payoffs

Cites Work

• Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games
• Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
• Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
• Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior
• Potential games
• Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust
• Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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