Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players
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Publication:405707
DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0828-9zbMath1302.91021OpenAlexW3123354864MaRDI QIDQ405707
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp606.pdf
Related Items (10)
Subjective probability, confidence, and Bayesian updating ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ Implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games ⋮ A strategic product for belief functions ⋮ Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ Belief hedges: Measuring ambiguity for all events and all models ⋮ A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
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