Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0114-xzbMath1241.91025MaRDI QIDQ427551

Berno Buechel, Tim Hellmann

Publication date: 13 June 2012

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://doc.rero.ch/record/305716/files/externalitiesred12publishedversion.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stability; efficiency; spillovers; networks; connections; externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91D30: Social networks; opinion dynamics

91A43: Games involving graphs

Related Items

Group representation concerns and network formation, Under-connected and over-connected networks: the role of externalities in strategic network formation, Competition for the access to and use of information in networks, On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks, Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities, Stability, efficiency, and contentedness of social storage networks, Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game, Evolution of social networks, Relationship externalities

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