Social surplus determines cooperation rates in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.010zbMath1394.91081MaRDI QIDQ516976

Gary Charness, Luca Rigotti, Aldo Rustichini

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

experimentbeliefsprisoner's dilemmacooperation rates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Evolution of cooperation through adaptive interaction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Equilibrium as compatibility of plans ⋮ Opportunistic conformism

Cites Work

• Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Beliefs and actions in the trust game: creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect
• Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
• Magical thinking: A representation result
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Promises and Partnership

This page was built for publication: Social surplus determines cooperation rates in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma