Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
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Publication:617583
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.002zbMath1232.91200MaRDI QIDQ617583
Publication date: 21 January 2011
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62639
monotonicity; incomplete information; incentive compatibility; approximate implementation; exact implementation
Related Items
Mechanism design and communication networks, Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability, Rationalizable implementation, A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies, Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs, Bayesian implementation with verifiable information, Weak implementation, Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
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