Unemployment insurance with hidden savings

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.03.016zbMath1205.91106OpenAlexW2010709442MaRDI QIDQ617668

Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23214/1/MPRA_paper_23214.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

unemployment insurancerepeated moral hazardhidden savingshidden wealth

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (7)

Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information ⋮ The optimal solution to a principal-agent problem with unknown agent ability ⋮ Characterization of optimal durations of unemployment benefits in a nonstationary job search model ⋮ A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model ⋮ Rights to retrade, free-riding and insurance requirement ⋮ On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending ⋮ A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity

Cites Work

• On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending
• Cash-on-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market
• Repeated Moral Hazard

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