Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0477-2zbMath1232.91165OpenAlexW1964965030MaRDI QIDQ622586

Ian Ayres, Colin Rowat, Nasser Zakariya

Publication date: 3 February 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0477-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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