Coordination and culture

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0990-3zbMath1398.91243OpenAlexW2466122887MaRDI QIDQ683824

Jean-Paul Carvalho

Publication date: 9 February 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:acb58735-23ab-45ad-9a81-df25b04773ba

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityconflictcoordination failureculture

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Games involving graphs (91A43) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes ⋮ Competing conventions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Prescriptive norms and social comparisons ⋮ Social coordination with locally observable types ⋮ The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict

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