Sufficient conditions for weak reciprocal upper semi-continuity in mixed extensions of games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.11.004zbMath1388.91073OpenAlexW2775182588MaRDI QIDQ684173

Jason J. Lepore, Blake A. Allison, Adib Bagh

Publication date: 9 February 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

better reply securitymixed strategy Nash equilibriaprobabilistic voting modelsweak reciprocal upper semi-continuity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games
• Verifying payoff security in the mixed extension of discontinuous games
• On equilibrium existence in payoff secure games
• Variational convergence: approximation and existence of equilibria in discontinuous games
• An existence result for discontinuous games
• Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games
• Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• Games with Discontinuous Payoffs
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment

This page was built for publication: Sufficient conditions for weak reciprocal upper semi-continuity in mixed extensions of games