Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions

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Publication:697954

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2914zbMath1015.91028OpenAlexW2151170464WikidataQ59540673 ScholiaQ59540673MaRDI QIDQ697954

Thomas R. Palfrey, Charles A. Holt, Jacob K. Goeree

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170810-132644522




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