Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
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Publication:697846
DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2829zbMath1051.91011OpenAlexW1971335524MaRDI QIDQ697846
Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 17 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2829
Related Items (28)
Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system ⋮ Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains ⋮ Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes ⋮ Threshold voting leads to type-revelation ⋮ On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions ⋮ Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness ⋮ Decomposing random mechanisms ⋮ Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness ⋮ Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo ⋮ An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains ⋮ Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Random dictatorship domains ⋮ On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals ⋮ A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals ⋮ Fully sincere voting ⋮ Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs ⋮ Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
Cites Work
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