Majority decisions when abstention is possible

DOI10.1016/j.disc.2011.12.024zbMath1243.91037arXiv1003.2756OpenAlexW181123448MaRDI QIDQ764902

Nicholas Matteo, Saharon Shelah, Paul B. Larson

Publication date: 16 March 2012

Published in: Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1003.2756

zbMATH Keywords

choice functiontournamentCondorcet's paradoxmajority decision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• What majority decisions are possible
• On \(\lambda\)-majority voting paradoxes
• Voting paradoxes and digraphs realizations
• The Voting Problem

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