On when a semantics is not a semantics: some reasons for disliking the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic
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Publication:754182
DOI10.1007/BF00258440zbMath0416.03022OpenAlexW2168302543MaRDI QIDQ754182
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00258440
negationentailmentrelevance logicRoutley-Meyer semanticsrelevant implicationphilosophicalAnderson-Belnap systemsparadoxes of strict implication
Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)
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