On when a semantics is not a semantics: some reasons for disliking the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic

DOI10.1007/BF00258440zbMath0416.03022MaRDI QIDQ754182

B. Jack Copeland

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00258440

zbMATH Keywords

negation; entailment; relevance logic; Routley-Meyer semantics; relevant implication; philosophical; Anderson-Belnap systems; paradoxes of strict implication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03B45: Modal logic (including the logic of norms)

03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations

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