Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90145-TzbMath0728.90025MaRDI QIDQ805485

Thomas A. Gresik

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

private informationbilateral tradepre-play communicationincentive compatible mechanismspayment ruletrading efficiencytrading rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs ⋮ The role of commitment in bilateral trade ⋮ Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values ⋮ Bilateral trading with naive traders ⋮ Strategic information transmission with sender's approval ⋮ Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.

Cites Work

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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• The efficiency of linear equilibria of sealed-bid double auctions
• Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

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