Essential equilibria in normal-form games

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Publication:848629


DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.06.002zbMath1202.91009MaRDI QIDQ848629

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Publication date: 4 March 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.06.002


91A10: Noncooperative games


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