Reaction function based dynamic location modeling in Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot competition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:883199
DOI10.1007/s11067-006-9013-4zbMath1137.91336OpenAlexW2020520961MaRDI QIDQ883199
Tan C. Miller, Roger L. Tobin, Changhyun Kwon, Terry L. Friesz
Publication date: 31 May 2007
Published in: Networks and Spatial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-006-9013-4
Related Items
Solving a location problem of a Stackelberg firm competing with Cournot-Nash firms, Capacity planning with competitive decision-makers: trilevel MILP formulation, degeneracy, and solution approaches, Analyses of location-price game on networks with stochastic customer behavior and its heuristic algorithm, Cournot-Stackelberg games in competitive delocation, A kernel search matheuristic to solve the discrete leader-follower location problem, Dynamic spatial auction market models with general cost mappings, Computation of multi-facility location Nash equilibria on a network under quantity competition, Optimizing the location of a production firm, Mathematical modeling for a \(p\)-mobile hub location problem in a dynamic environment by a genetic algorithm
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Sensitivity analysis for variational inequalities
- A dynamic spatial Cournot-Nash equilibrium model and an algorithm
- Sensitivity Analysis for Variational Inequalities Defined on Polyhedral Sets
- On the relationship between Nash—Cournot and Wardrop equilibria
- Alternative Models of Spatial Competition
- Algorithms for the Network Oligopoly Problem
- Sensitivity Analysis in Variational Inequalities
- A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium
- Incorporating competitors' reactions in facility location decisions: A market equilibrium approach
- A variational inequality approach for the determination of oligopolistic market equilibrium
- Variational inequalities
