Price competition in markets with customer testing: the captive customer effect
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Publication:926224
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0250-7zbMath1147.91016MaRDI QIDQ926224
Heidrun C. Hoppe, Ulrich Lehmann-Grube
Publication date: 26 May 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0250-7
testing; mixed strategies; subgame-perfect equilibrium; Hotelling's model; iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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