The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.01.001zbMath1230.91088OpenAlexW2063224664MaRDI QIDQ980972

Özgür Yılmaz

Publication date: 8 July 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/6282

zbMATH Keywords

random assignmentordinal efficiencyno justified-envysimultaneous eating algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (18)

Trading probabilities along cycles ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ The object allocation problem with random priorities ⋮ On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties ⋮ The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment ⋮ Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments ⋮ Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization ⋮ Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? ⋮ Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism ⋮ An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments ⋮ Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals

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