Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.001zbMath1186.91111MaRDI QIDQ996381

Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; externalities; sharing the surplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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Cites Work

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