The price of selfish routing
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Publication:996709
DOI10.1007/s00453-006-0056-1zbMath1137.91007MaRDI QIDQ996709
Marios Mavronicolas, Paul G. Spirakis
Publication date: 19 July 2007
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-006-0056-1
91A10: Noncooperative games
68M10: Network design and communication in computer systems
91A43: Games involving graphs
90B20: Traffic problems in operations research
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