On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks

DOI10.1007/S10951-009-0118-8zbMath1177.90141OpenAlexW2028388306MaRDI QIDQ1041343

Eric Angel, Alex-Ariel Tchetgnia, Fanny Pascual, Evripidis Bampis

Publication date: 2 December 2009

Published in: Journal of Scheduling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-009-0118-8

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryschedulingapproximation algorithmstruthfulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (9)

Scheduling without payments ⋮ Reducing price of anarchy of selfish task allocation with more selfishness ⋮ The anarchy of scheduling without money ⋮ Fair resource allocation for different scenarios of demands ⋮ Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs ⋮ Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms ⋮ Truthfulness for the Sum of Weighted Completion Times ⋮ The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money ⋮ Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines

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• Scheduling Parallel Machines On-Line
• STACS 2004
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Bounds on Multiprocessing Timing Anomalies
• STACS 2005
• Algorithmic mechanism design

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