From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(85)90002-2zbMath0577.90005OpenAlexW2079907149MaRDI QIDQ1065691

Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(85)90002-2

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's impossibility theoremoligarchyacyclic and anonymous aggregation methodsquasi-transitive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules ⋮ Binary effectivity rules ⋮ Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability ⋮ A conflict analysis approach for illuminating distributional issues in sustainability policy ⋮ Transitivity revisited ⋮ A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

This page was built for publication: From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences