Discrete allocation mechanisms: Dimensional requirements for resource- allocation mechanisms when desired outcomes are unbounded

DOI10.1016/0885-064X(85)90015-9zbMath0604.90011MaRDI QIDQ1083342

Thomas Marschak, Leonid Hurwicz

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

continuum Walrasian mechanisminformationally efficient privacy-preserving resource allocation mechanismsminimal message-space sizetwo-person, two-commodity linear-quadratic exchange economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

The complexity of resource allocation and price mechanisms under bounded rationality ⋮ Approximating a function by choosing a covering of its domain and k points from its range ⋮ Some aspects of effectively constructive mathematics that are relevant to the foundations of neoclassical mathematical economics and the theory of games ⋮ Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies

Cites Work

• Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns
• On the informational size of message spaces
• On the informational size of message spaces for resource allocation processes
• On the Informational Size of Message Spaces for Efficient Resource Allocation Processes
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Discrete allocation mechanisms: Dimensional requirements for resource- allocation mechanisms when desired outcomes are unbounded