Game dynamics, mixed strategies, and gradient systems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1089282
DOI10.1016/0040-5809(87)90043-8zbMath0618.92013OpenAlexW2082898424MaRDI QIDQ1089282
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(87)90043-8
gradient systemmixed strategieschemical kineticsecologyreplicator equationssex rationon-Euclidean metricevolutionary optimisationfrequencies of the phenotypesfrequency-dependent population geneticsGame dynamicsphenotypes
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10)
Related Items (15)
An application of the continuous time replicator dynamic to economics ⋮ The role of mixed strategies in spatial evolutionary games ⋮ A maximum principle for frequency dependent selection ⋮ A density-dependent model describing age-structured population dynamics using hawk–dove tactics ⋮ Gradients for the evolution of bimatrix games ⋮ Mutation-selection models in population genetics and evolutionary game theory ⋮ Game-dynamical aspects of the prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Cross entropy minimization in uninvadable states of complex populations ⋮ A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Gradient flow formulations of discrete and continuous evolutionary models: a unifying perspective ⋮ Evolution in games with a continuous action space ⋮ Evolutionary multiplayer games ⋮ Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Evolutionary stability: States and strategies
- Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models
- The selection mutation equation
- On evolutionary genetic stability of the sex ratio
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Stable Polymorphisms in a Selection Model with Mutation
- A new mathematical framework for the study of linkage and selection
- On the occurrence of limit cycles in the Volterra-Lotka equation
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
This page was built for publication: Game dynamics, mixed strategies, and gradient systems