Why Gödel's theorem cannot refute computationalism

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Publication:1274689

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DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00052-6zbMath0908.68057DBLPjournals/ai/LaForteHF98OpenAlexW2001389108WikidataQ56060645 ScholiaQ56060645MaRDI QIDQ1274689

Kenneth M. Ford, Patrick J. Hayes, Geoffrey L. LaForte

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(98)00052-6

zbMATH Keywords

truth Gödel computationalism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).

Related Items (3)

A refutation of Penrose's Gödelian case against artificial intelligence ⋮ What is the Church-Turing Thesis? ⋮ The modal argument for hypercomputing minds

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