Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0682zbMath0926.91010OpenAlexW2140342036MaRDI QIDQ1294107

Deborah Minehart, Suzanne Scotchmer

Publication date: 11 November 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ac64066a95983b59ce8bbe96af34c9595edc0057

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectations equilibriumherdsno-regretprobabilistic existence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (3)

Stable outcomes and information in games: an empirical framework ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games ⋮ Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information

Cites Work

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• Rational expectations in microeconomic models: An overview
• On the existence of rational expectations equilibrium
• Agreeing to disagree
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games
• Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information
• On the convergence of informational cascades
• Strict rational expectations equilibria with diffuseness
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment

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