Externalities, market power, and resource extraction

DOI10.1006/jeem.1999.1067zbMath0937.91055OpenAlexW3121256932MaRDI QIDQ1302624

Manjira Datta, Leonard J. Mirman

Publication date: 22 September 1999

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1999.1067

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymarket powerexternalityCournot-Nash equilibriumtragedy-of-the-commons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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