A laboratory investigation of multiperson rationality and presentation effects

DOI10.1006/game.1994.1026zbMath0805.90140MaRDI QIDQ1324089

V. Pereyra

Publication date: 31 January 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=mgmt_papers

zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experiments; two-person decision problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A35: Decision theory for games

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