The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle

DOI10.1007/BF01213253zbMath0810.90023MaRDI QIDQ1339031

Jill Van Newenhizen

Publication date: 18 December 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Borda Countweighted voting systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (15)

Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best? ⋮ Construction of voting situations concordant with ranking patterns ⋮ Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes ⋮ Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions ⋮ Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules ⋮ Preference densities and social choices ⋮ On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner ⋮ The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters ⋮ The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes ⋮ On the probability of observing Borda's paradox ⋮ Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes ⋮ On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives ⋮ On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules ⋮ Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures ⋮ Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cites Work

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• The Borda dictionary
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
• The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability
• The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems
• Inconsistencies of Weighted Summation Voting Systems
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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