Implementation of college admission rules

DOI10.1007/s001990050121zbMath0872.90006MaRDI QIDQ1357430

Tayfun Sönmez, Tarık Kara

Publication date: 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/46115

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matching; strong Nash implementation; matching rules; college admissions problems; public decision problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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