The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules

zbMath0886.90043MaRDI QIDQ1357431

Donald G. Saari

Publication date: 1997

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

winning coalition; \(q\)-rule; structure of the core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

Related Items

Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change, Siting noxious facilities: efficiency and majority rule decisions, Formal versus informal legislative bargaining, Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey, The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters, Voting originated social dynamics: quartile analysis of stochastic environment peculiarities, Endogenous voting agendas, Existence of a multicameral core, Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections, Necessary gradient restrictions at the core of a voting rule, Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed, Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter, Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining, Condorcet winners and social acceptability, The ``probability of a fit choice, Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections, Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties, Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems, Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model, The intellectual contribution of Condorcet to the founding of the US republic 1785-1800