Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)90002-7zbMath0877.90099OpenAlexW2100222570MaRDI QIDQ1366895

Yong-Gwan Kim

Publication date: 17 September 1997

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)90002-7

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategiesevolutionary game theoryrepeated prisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Inefficient stage Nash is not stable ⋮ Three steps ahead ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Direct reciprocity in structured populations ⋮ Stability and trembles in extensive-form games ⋮ Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

Cites Work

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• Cooperation in the short and in the long run
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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