Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining

DOI10.1007/s001990050177zbMath0891.90183MaRDI QIDQ1381082

D. Massart

Publication date: 15 March 1998

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050177

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic process; \(k\)-player sequential bargaining; unique stationary subgame perfect payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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