On preference and freedom

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Publication:1387715

DOI10.1023/A:1004924211553zbMath0905.90003WikidataQ56770940 ScholiaQ56770940MaRDI QIDQ1387715

Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Yongsheng Xu

Publication date: 8 June 1998

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)




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