Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1408641
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00021-6zbMath1066.91033MaRDI QIDQ1408641
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Partnership Dissolution: Information and Efficiency, Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers, When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships, Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations, Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions, A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share, On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality, Contests with rank-order spillovers, Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade., Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions, The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions, Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values, Partnership dissolution and proprietary information, Dissolving (in)effective partnerships, Auctions with financial externalities
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
