Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
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Publication:1423684
DOI10.1007/s001820300156zbMath1063.91065MaRDI QIDQ1423684
Publication date: 7 March 2004
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300156
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