Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth approach
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Publication:1571044
DOI10.1007/s001990050309zbMath0962.91050MaRDI QIDQ1571044
Dan Kovenock, Beth Allen, Tom Faith, Raymond J. Deneckere
Publication date: 9 July 2000
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr187.pdf
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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