Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1599833
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2862zbMath1031.91023MaRDI QIDQ1599833
Michel Le Breton, Matthew O. Jackson, Bhaskar Dutta
Publication date: 27 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b491053b0511785747b83ccd74337d20a8af8d4f
voting; successive elimination; candidacy game; strategic candidacy; tree and binary voting procedure
91B12: Voting theory
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