Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2808zbMath1137.91324OpenAlexW2030212627MaRDI QIDQ1601452

Toshimasa Maruta

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2808

zbMATH Keywords

binary gamesprobabilistic behaviorselection integralselection outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (21)

On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network games ⋮ The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games ⋮ Stochastically stable equilibria in \(n\)-person binary coordination games ⋮ A symmetry of fixation times in evoultionary dynamics ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ SKEW-SYMMETRY UNDER SIMULTANEOUS REVISIONS ⋮ An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics ⋮ Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule ⋮ Prospect dynamics and loss dominance ⋮ Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run ⋮ Robust stochastic stability ⋮ The logit-response dynamics ⋮ Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games ⋮ Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium ⋮ Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.

Cites Work

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• The Evolution of Conventions
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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