An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game.

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00077-XzbMath1100.91505MaRDI QIDQ1605199

Peter A. Zadrozny, Baoline Chen

Publication date: 15 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

duopoly modelcontinuous-time gamesdiscrete--time gamessuboptimal-consistent feedback solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (6)

Linear quadratic game of exploitation of common renewable resources with inherent constraints ⋮ OPTIMAL POLICY IN RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODELS: NEW SOLUTION ALGORITHMS ⋮ Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games: A New Approach via Information Updating ⋮ Stackelberg method to stabilize game-based control system ⋮ Min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies with closed-loop information structure ⋮ Dynamic programming approach to discrete time dynamic feedback Stackelberg games with independent and dependent followers

Uses Software

• minpack

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A consistent, closed-loop solution for infinite-horizon, linear- quadratic, dynamic Stackelberg games
• Closed-loop Stackelberg solution to a multistage linear-quadratic game
• Team-optimal closed-loop Stackelberg strategies in hierarchical control problems
• Equilibrium solutions in dynamic dominant-player models
• A global theory for linear-quadratic differential games
• Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime
• A Schur method for solving algebraic Riccati equations
• Exact likelihood of vector autoregressive-moving average process with missing or aggregated data
• Noncooperative and Dominant Player Solutions in Discrete Dynamic Games
• Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies in linear-quadratic problems
• Closed-loop Stackelberg strategies with applications in the optimal control of multilevel systems

This page was built for publication: An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game.