Refinement of the equilibrium of public goods games over networks: efficiency and effort of specialized equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.002zbMath1418.91105arXiv1607.02037OpenAlexW2471911475WikidataQ129981978 ScholiaQ129981978MaRDI QIDQ1633669

Parthe Pandit, Ankur A. Kulkarni

Publication date: 20 December 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.02037

zbMATH Keywords

linear complementarity problemspublic goodsindependent setsnetwork gamesspecialized equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (3)

Aggregate play and welfare in strategic interactions on networks ⋮ On independent cliques and linear complementarity problems ⋮ Information revelation through signalling

Cites Work

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• On the variational equilibrium as a refinement of the generalized Nash equilibrium
• Public goods in networks
• WELL-COVERED GRAPHS: A SURVEY
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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