The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games
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Publication:1735811
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.01.009zbMath1419.91045OpenAlexW2914835476WikidataQ128411299 ScholiaQ128411299MaRDI QIDQ1735811
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.009
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Cites Work
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