Stability and voting by committees with exit

DOI10.1007/S00355-003-0246-6zbMath1090.91017OpenAlexW2172239408MaRDI QIDQ1762858

Gustavo Bergantiños, Dolors Berga, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme

Publication date: 11 February 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15137

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

Simple collective identity functions ⋮ Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences ⋮ Procedural group identification ⋮ An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit ⋮ Candidate stability and voting correspondences ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model ⋮ On exiting after voting ⋮ Unanimity and resource monotonicity ⋮ Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains

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