A note on best response dynamics.

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0636zbMath1131.91307OpenAlexW2104834796MaRDI QIDQ1818289

Ed Hopkins

Publication date: 4 January 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/725ba23bcc6784c687314662c0bac69ef0a37f6e

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (32)

Evolution of cooperation under the coexistence of imitation and aspiration dynamics in structured populations ⋮ Riemannian game dynamics ⋮ On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria ⋮ On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games ⋮ Learning in perturbed asymmetric games ⋮ Optimal learning dynamics of multiagent system in restless multiarmed bandit game ⋮ The role of pairwise nonlinear evolutionary dynamics in the rock-paper-scissors game with noise ⋮ Testing the TASP: an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria ⋮ On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics ⋮ ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY ⋮ Stable biased sampling ⋮ Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play ⋮ The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria ⋮ Quantal response equilibria with heterogeneous agents ⋮ Best-response dynamics in zero-sum stochastic games ⋮ Convergent multiple-timescales reinforcement learning algorithms in normal form games ⋮ Comparison between best-response dynamics and replicator dynamics in a social-ecological model of lake eutrophication ⋮ Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria ⋮ Local stability of strict equilibria under evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Learning purified mixed equilibria ⋮ Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable? ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: asymmetric games ⋮ Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method ⋮ Learning in games with unstable equilibria ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization ⋮ Is ambiguity aversion bad for innovation? ⋮ Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics ⋮ The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets ⋮ On (un)knots and dynamics in games ⋮ Entropic penalties in finite games

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• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
• Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
• Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• Evolutionary Games in Economics

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