Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
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Publication:1823196
DOI10.1016/0040-5809(89)90027-0zbMath0679.92023MaRDI QIDQ1823196
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(89)90027-0
evolutionary stability; conflict; cooperative strategies; Prisoner's dilemma; altruistic behavior; finite mixture of pure strategies; TIT-FOR-TAT
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