Evolutionarily stable strategies and viability selection in Mendelian populations

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Publication:1835874

DOI10.1016/0040-5809(82)90042-9zbMath0504.92021OpenAlexW2018900982MaRDI QIDQ1835874

Ilan Eshel

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(82)90042-9






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