Fair imposition

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.005zbMath1099.91053MaRDI QIDQ1886294

Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date: 18 November 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

Fairness; Mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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Cites Work

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