Robust inference in communication games with partial provability

DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1046zbMath0843.90148MaRDI QIDQ1906449

Barton L. Lipman, Duane J. Seppi

Publication date: 19 August 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/aaeb8390d80306db54d2d319fde59f09fa4a7551

zbMATH Keywords

sequential message-sending games; uninformed decision maker

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B44: Economics of information

91A35: Decision theory for games

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