Pigouvian taxation of energy for flow and stock externalities and strategic, noncompetitive energy pricing

DOI10.1006/jeem.1994.1001zbMath0857.90017OpenAlexW2037557009WikidataQ59212089 ScholiaQ59212089MaRDI QIDQ1918631

Franz Wirl

Publication date: 30 October 1996

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1994.1001

zbMATH Keywords

energy consumptionsubgame perfect Nash equilibriumenerg taxationlinear and nonlinear Markov strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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