Complete characterization of functions satisfying the conditions of Arrow's theorem

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0547-0zbMATH Open1280.91059DBLPjournals/scw/MosselT12arXiv0910.2465OpenAlexW3105553292WikidataQ59927009 ScholiaQ59927009MaRDI QIDQ1926600FDOQ1926600

Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz

Publication date: 28 December 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Arrow's theorem implies that a social choice function satisfying Transitivity, the Pareto Principle (Unanimity) and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) must be dictatorial. When non-strict preferences are allowed, a dictatorial social choice function is defined as a function for which there exists a single voter whose strict preferences are followed. This definition allows for many different dictatorial functions. In particular, we construct examples of dictatorial functions which do not satisfy Transitivity and IIA. Thus Arrow's theorem, in the case of non-strict preferences, does not provide a complete characterization of all social choice functions satisfying Transitivity, the Pareto Principle, and IIA. The main results of this article provide such a characterization for Arrow's theorem, as well as for follow up results by Wilson. In particular, we strengthen Arrow's and Wilson's result by giving an exact if and only if condition for a function to satisfy Transitivity and IIA (and the Pareto Principle). Additionally, we derive formulas for the number of functions satisfying these conditions.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0910.2465

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
• Actions of a Locally Compact Group with Zero

Cited In (4)

• The birth of social choice theory from the spirit of mathematical logic: Arrow's theorem in the framework of model theory
• Public goods and Arrovian social choice
• Complete characterization of zero-expressible functions
• Invariance axioms for preferences: applications to social choice theory

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